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Abstract
The success or failure of human collective action often depends on the cooperation tenden-
cies of individuals in groups, and on the information that individuals have about each other’s
cooperativeness. However, it is unclear whether these two factors have an interactive effect
on cooperation dynamics. Using a decision-making experiment, we confirm that groups
comprising individuals with higher cooperation tendencies cooperate at a higher level than
groups comprising individuals with low cooperation tendencies. Moreover, assorting individ-
uals with similar cooperation tendency together affected behaviour so that the most cooper-
ative individuals tended to cooperate more and the least cooperative individuals cooperated
less, compared to their behaviour in randomly formed groups. In line with predictions of evo-
lutionary models of cooperation, there was a strong positive association between individu-
als’ cooperation tendency and success when groups were formed assortatively, whereas
such association did not exist when groups were formed randomly. Surprisingly, information
about group members’ cooperativeness in assorted groups had no effect on cooperation
levels. We discuss potential explanations for why information about cooperativeness of oth-
ers may be disregarded in certain circumstances.
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation has been challenging to explain because free-riding individuals,
who reap the benefits of cooperation without contributing to its costs, will often achieve higher
payoffs than cooperators [1,2]. Explanations of human cooperation have largely been based on
reciprocity, in which cooperation is directed to those who are expected to cooperate in kind.
Reciprocity relies on information about the previous behaviour of interaction partners [3–6].
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An individual can gather information about the cooperativeness of others through personal
interaction [7,8], or through third parties [9,10]. Many experiments have shown that humans
mainly cooperate with those who have cooperated with them in the past [11,12], or with those
who have been cooperative in interactions with third parties [12–15].
Gathering information on others’ cooperativeness is critical for social decision making:
studies from a range of disciplines have shown that there are individual differences in
human cooperation tendencies [12,16–22], and these tendencies are consistent across time
and context [19,21,23–25]. Evolutionary theories predict that this variation in human coop-
erativeness plays an important role in the performance of groups [26,27]. Empirical evi-
dence, by and large, confirms these predictions: when individuals with similar cooperation
tendencies group together through positive assortment, cooperators may thrive as they can
enjoy the benefits of cooperation without being exploited by less cooperative individuals
[17,21,28,29].
Despite the importance of assortment and information about partner cooperativeness for
the evolution of human cooperation, it remains poorly understood how these two factors
interact. De Oliveira et al. [30] found that in assorted groups, cooperative decisions of both the
most and the least cooperative individuals were insensitive to information about the coopera-
tion tendencies of their group members. In addition, work by Ga¨chter and Tho¨ni [31,32] sug-
gests that information on the similarity of group members’ past cooperative decisions has no
effect on overall cooperation level. As these findings contrast with numerous studies showing
the substantial effect of information on others past cooperativeness (e.g. 11–14), additional
experiments are needed to unravel the interplay of information and assortment.
Here we study how assorting individuals with similar cooperation tendencies to groups,
and information about group members’ cooperativeness in assorted groups, affect cooperation
and the success of individuals in a public goods game. Specifically, we conducted a decision-
making experiment to test three main hypotheses: i) assortment leads to differences in the
level of cooperation across groups comprising different types of individuals; ii) assortment
leads to a positive association between individual cooperation tendency and earnings in the
game, whereas such an association should not exist in the absence of assortment; iii) providing
information on the nature of assortment amplifies the differences in cooperation levels
between assorted groups.
These hypotheses are based on previous findings that individual differences in coopera-
tiveness are consistent [19,23] and that individuals tend to adjust their cooperation to the
anticipated cooperation of their group members as suggested by models of direct and indirect
reciprocity (e.g. 5,14,16). Thus, as cooperation depends on the anticipated cooperation of
others, informing the most cooperative individuals that they will interact only with other
highly cooperative individuals should fuel trust and cooperation through anticipated reci-
procity. Similarly, informing the least cooperative individuals that they will interact with
other non-cooperators should create anticipation of defection, leading to lower levels of
cooperation.
We show that assorting individuals into groups based on individual cooperativeness had
substantial effects on the level of cooperation within groups, partly because assortment seemed
to make more cooperative individuals cooperate more and the least cooperative individuals
cooperate less, compared to a random grouping setting. Further, we found a consistent posi-
tive association between individuals’ cooperation tendency and success when groups were
formed assortatively, but not when groups were formed randomly. Surprisingly, however, we
found that individuals were insensitive to the provided information on the composition of
their group.
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Methods
To study the effects of assortment and information about assortment on cooperation in
groups, we conducted an experiment based on the public goods game (PGG). The PGG
reflects a situation in which temptation to free-ride makes it difficult to maintain individually
costly cooperation. In a linear PGG, the average payoff per group member is maximized if all
group members cooperate, that is if everybody contributes maximally to the public good. Yet,
any personal contribution decreases the net payoff to the individual group member. Therefore,
in each single round of the PGG, individual payoff is maximised by contributing nothing and
profiting from the contributions of others.
In each of our experimental sessions, sixteen subjects were arranged in groups of four, in
which they repeatedly played a PGG. At the beginning of each round, each subject was allo-
cated 20 points to distribute between a group project and their personal account. After all four
subjects had made their decisions, the total contributions to the group project were doubled
and divided equally among the group members, irrespective of their contributions. After each
round, subjects were presented with the anonymized contributions and earnings of each of
their fellow group members.
The experimental setup consisted of two stages. In Stage 1, subjects interacted over ten
rounds of a PGG, with group composition randomly changing after every round. This means
that subjects essentially played a series of one-shot PGGs. In this setup, there are no possibili-
ties for strategic cooperation or build-up of reputation, and contributing nothing is the domi-
nant strategy. Accordingly, we interpret the average contribution level (on the range 0–20)
over all rounds of Stage 1 as a measure of a subject’s cooperation tendency. Subjects in each
session were classified to four ‘cooperative tiers’ based on their behaviour in Stage 1, with four
subjects with the highest cooperation tendency belonging to tier 1, the four second most coop-
erative to tier 2, the four third most to tier 3, and the four least cooperative to tier 4. The sub-
jects did not know that Stage 1 was designed to measure their cooperation tendency, nor were
they aware of the nature of Stage 2 before it began. In the beginning of the experiment, the sub-
jects were only informed that the study would continue after Stage 1 and that they would
receive new instructions on their computer screen after completing Stage 1.
Stage 2 was designed to study if assorting individuals with similar cooperation tendencies
affects cooperation and if information about previous cooperativeness of group members
affects cooperation in assorted groups. In Stage 2, subjects interacted additional 15 rounds of
the PGG, this time with group composition remaining fixed over all rounds. We implemented
three treatments (Fig 1): Informed Assortment (IA), Uninformed Assortment (UA) and Unin-
formed Random grouping (UR). To test if assortment affects cooperation of individuals from
different cooperative tiers we compared treatments UA and UR, and to test if information
about assortment affects cooperation in assorted groups we compared treatments IA and UA.
In treatments IA and UA, subjects were assorted into groups based on their cooperativeness
in Stage 1 so that individuals from the same cooperative tier in Stage 1 were grouped together.
In treatment IA, subjects were informed at the beginning of Stage 2 about the assortment pro-
cedure and to which cooperative tier they belonged (e.g. “Now all players are ranked and
grouped according to their contributions in the first ten rounds. The player that contributed
most is ranked #1 and the player contributed the least is ranked #16. You are in the group of
players ranked 13–16”). In treatment UA, the subjects were informed that the groups were
now fixed, but they were not informed about the assortment procedure. In treatment UR,
groups were formed randomly with respect to the cooperative tier in Stage 1, and the subjects
were only informed that the groups were now fixed.
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The experiment consisted of fifteen sessions, with five sessions for each of the three treat-
ments (sixteen subjects in each session, total N = 240; 71% females (50–94% per session), aged
19–33 years, mostly university students across variety of disciplines, 68% had earlier experi-
ence with economic experiments. The level of cooperation in the first round did not differ
between male and female subjects (ANOVA: F1,190 = 0.123, p = 0.726) and was not impacted
by earlier experience with participation in economic experiments (F1,190 = 2.367, p = 0.126).
Subjects gave written informed consent before participating. The experimental setup was
approved by the Sociological Laboratory of the University of Groningen. We followed the
guidelines established by the VSNU Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice when running
experimental sessions.
Instructions for the experiment were read out loud by the experimenter at the start of each
session. Instructions for the two separate stages, including the number of rounds, were
explained to subjects on their computer screens at the beginning of each stage. Before the start
of each stage, subjects filled out a short quiz to check their comprehension. Sessions lasted
about one hour and subjects earned on average €14.87 (ranging from €10.56 to €18.35).
Fig 1. Experimental procedure. Subjects played a total of 25 rounds of the PGG in three experimental
treatments: Informed Assortment (IA), Uninformed Assortment (UA) and Uninformed Random grouping (UR).
Each treatment was replicated 5 times. Each of the 15 replicates was run in a session involving 16 subjects. In
Stage 1, the subjects played 10 rounds of the PGG in groups of four where group composition changed
randomly after each round. After Stage 1, all subjects were informed that the groups were fixed for the next 15
rounds of PGG of Stage 2. In the IA and UA treatments the four fixed groups were formed by assorting the 16
subjects according to their mean contributions in the 10 rounds of Stage 1. Only in the IA treatment, subjects
received the additional information that the groups were assorted according to cooperativeness, and to which
cooperative tier they were allocated. In the UR treatment, the four fixed groups were formed at random.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.g001
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Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment and were unaware of the earnings of
others. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree
[33] (code available upon request from the first author). All statistical analyses were conducted
with SPSS (v. 20.0.0.2) and R (v. 3.1.3).
Results
As expected, when individuals with similar cooperation tendencies were grouped together,
there were strong differences in the level of cooperation between groups, depending on the
cooperative tier of the subjects (Fig 2 treatments IA and UA, Table 1). In Stage 2, cooperation
Fig 2. Cooperation by subjects from different cooperative tiers in assorted and random groups in
Stage 2. In treatments Informed Assortment and Uninformed Assortment, groups were formed by assorting
subjects according to their cooperation tendencies measured in Stage 1. In the Uninformed Random grouping
treatment, groups were formed randomly. Note that while in treatments Informed Assortment and Uninformed
Assortment subjects in a group belong to the same cooperative tier, in the Uninformed Random treatment
groups comprised individuals from different cooperative tiers. Lines indicate mean contribution of individuals
belonging to the same cooperative tier across five replicate sessions (green: tier 1, blue: tier 2, red: tier 3,
black: tier 4). Error bars indicate ±1 s.e of individual contributions. See Table 1 for statistical analysis of effects
of information and assortment on contribution levels.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.g002
Table 1. Anova based on Linear Mixed Models (LMMs) fitted to contributions in Stage 2, using ‘subject nested in group’ as a random effect. The
model estimates are given in the Supporting Information (S1 Table). The analysis includes a comparison of (i) Uninformed Assortment and Uninformed Ran-
dom grouping to study the effect of assortment and (ii) a comparison of Informed Assortment and Uninformed Assortment to study the effect of information.
The factors “Assortment” and “Information” compare treatments. ‘Round’ is the round number (1–15) to account for time trends in cooperation levels in Stage
2 (Fig 2) and ‘Cooperative tier’ is a factor reflecting individuals’ tier rank (1, 2, 3 or 4) based on cooperation in Stage 1. The significant interaction between
‘Assortment’ and ‘Cooperative tier’ results from larger differences between individuals with the highest and lowest cooperation tendencies in assortment com-
pared to the random grouping treatment (i.e., assortment amplifies existing cooperation tendencies). Surprisingly, the effect of ‘Information’ is not significant.
In each treatment, there were 80 subjects (five sessions with 16 subjects in each session).
Uninformed Assortment vs
Uninformed Random grouping
SS MS df F p
Assortment 0.10 0.10 1 0.00 0.96
Round 14876.50 14876.50 1 572.74 < 0.01
Cooperative tier 755.80 251.90 3 9.70 < 0.01
Assortment * Cooperative tier 261.40 87.10 3 3.36 0.03
Informed Assortment vs
Uninformed Random grouping
SS MS df F p
Information 20.50 20.50 1 0.68 0.42
Round 11400.90 11400.90 1 377.34 < 0.01
Cooperative tier 1283.60 427.90 3 14.16 < 0.01
Information * Cooperative tier 60.80 20.30 3 0.67 0.58
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.t001
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levels in assorted groups corresponded to the ‘cooperative tiers’ assigned to individuals in
Stage 1 (with tier 1 having the highest cooperation level, followed by 2, 3 and then 4).
As a consequence of the between-tier differences in cooperation levels in assorted groups
(treatments UA and IA), there was a positive association between individual cooperation ten-
dency measured in Stage 1 and earnings in Stage 2 (Fig 3). However, such an association was
not observed when groups were formed randomly (treatment UR). The association between
cooperation tendency and earnings was quantified by linear regression coefficient of earnings
in Stage 2 on mean contributions in Stage 1 for each experimental session (βTreatment = mean
regression coefficient, lower and upper 95% confidence limits in parentheses: βIA = 1.78 (0.78,
2.78); βUA = 1.88 (1.22, 2.64); βUR = 0.19 (-1.03, 1.41)). The regression coefficients differed sig-
nificantly between the treatments (ANOVA: F2, 14 = 6.70, p = 0.01), and a Tukey test revealed
that the coefficients in the random grouping treatment differed significantly from those in
both assortment treatments (UR vs IA: p = 0.024, UR vs UA: p = 0.018).
Moreover, assortment modulated the cooperative behaviour of individuals. As can be seen
in Figs 2 and 4, the differences in the level of cooperation of individuals belonging to different
cooperative tiers were larger when groups were formed by assortment than when they were
formed at random. This result is corroborated by a statistically significant interaction between
the effects of assortment and cooperative tier on mean contributions in Stage 2 (Table 1;
p = 0.03). The strongest effect of assortment on cooperation was observed among the least
cooperative individuals (tier 4; see Fig 4).
However, contrary to our expectations, informing individuals about the assortment proce-
dure and the cooperativeness of fellow group members did not affect overall or per-tier levels
of cooperation in assorted groups (Table 1: comparison between treatments UA and IA; ‘Infor-
mation’ and interaction between ‘Information’ and ‘Cooperative tier’ are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero). In all tiers, cooperation decreased over time (Fig 2).
In order to explicitly test if information on the assortment procedure affected cooperation
immediately after this information was received, we compared mean contributions in the
first round of Stage 2 in each cooperative tier in treatment UA with those in treatment IA
Fig 3. Association between cooperativeness and earnings. The relationship between individual mean contribution in
Stage 1 (measuring cooperation tendency) and mean earnings in Stage 2 (measuring success) for each of the three
treatments. Coloured dots indicate individuals from each session (each session comprising 16 individuals) and lines
indicate linear regressions for each session.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.g003
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(Table 2). However, even in this restricted case, information on cooperativeness had no effect
on the cooperation of any tier.
Discussion
In line with earlier studies [28,29,34], we found that when individuals are assorted to groups
based on their cooperativeness, groups comprising more cooperative individuals are able to
maintain higher levels of cooperation than groups comprising less cooperative individuals.
However, as the level of cooperation slightly declined even in the most cooperative assorted
groups, experiments with even more interaction rounds are needed to determine if differences
in cooperation are maintained in the long run. We also demonstrate that in assorted groups,
differences in the level of cooperation resulted in a consistent positive association between
individual cooperation tendency and success. In contrast, when groups were formed
Fig 4. Effect of assortment on cooperation for the four cooperative tiers. Black bars represent the
individuals in the Uninformed Assortment treatment and grey bars represent the individuals in the Uninformed
Random treatment. Significance values refer to independent sample t-tests (not assuming equal variances)
comparing contributions within each cooperative tier. Error bars indicate ±1 s.e.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.g004
Table 2. Comparison of individual contributions in the first round of Stage 2 between Informed Assortment (IA) and Uninformed Assortment (UA).
For each cooperative tier, we show the mean and standard error of individual contributions pooled over the five replicates. The group identity is not included in
the analysis because the decisions of subjects in a group can be considered independent in the first round of Stage 2. The average contribution does not differ
significantly between treatments in any of the four tiers (independent-samples t-test).
Informed Assortment (IA) Uninformed Assortment (UA)
Cooperative tier mean s.e. mean s.e. t38 p
1st 17.65 1.10 15.60 1.38 1.16 0.25
2nd 13.65 1.57 15.55 1.26 -0.94 0.35
3rd 11.65 1.44 13.30 1.43 -0.81 0.42
4th 10.30 1.77 9.80 1.92 0.19 0.85
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185859.t002
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randomly, there was no consistent association between individual cooperation tendency and
success, as in the study by Kurzban and Houser [19]. These results support evolutionary theo-
ries holding that positive assortment is important for the success of cooperation [26,27].
Interestingly, we find that assortment influenced cooperation so that the individuals with
the highest cooperation tendencies were inclined to cooperate even more when assorted with
other cooperators, and the individuals with the lowest cooperation tendencies cooperated at
an even lower level when grouped with other non-cooperators, in comparison to the situation
where groups were formed randomly with respect to subjects’ cooperation tendencies. This
finding is in line with results of Van den Berg et al. [22], who found that individuals with low-
est cooperation tendencies are likely to follow the example of the least cooperative behaviour
in a group, whereas the most cooperative individuals tended to follow the example of more
cooperative behaviour. These different responses to the behaviour of others may partly explain
the strong differences in levels of cooperation among different cooperative tiers in the assorted
groups.
Contrary to our expectations, information about assortment and cooperativeness of fellow
group members did not affect the level of cooperation or the success of individuals with differ-
ent cooperation tendencies. The provided information did not influence individual coopera-
tive decisions of individuals from any cooperative tier even in the first round of Stage 2,
immediately after the information was received (Table 2). Our result is in line with Ga¨chter
and Tho¨ni (2011), who found no effect of knowledge of being grouped with “like-minded”
cooperators on mean cooperation. Our result is also in line with De Oliveira et al. (30), who
found that providing information about the heterogeneity of cooperative types (conditional
cooperators and selfish types) within groups did not affect cooperation in either homogenous
or heterogeneous groups. Our study differed from De Oliveira et al.’s (30) in three main
respects: i) the information given (previous cooperativeness and assortment vs. variation in
cooperative type), ii) in composition of groups (whole population with homogenous groups of
cooperative tiers vs. population subset of selfish and conditional cooperator types in heteroge-
neous and homogeneous groups) and in iii) group size (4 instead of 3). Even so, both studies
arrive at similar conclusions, suggesting that our findings do not reflect specifics of the experi-
mental implementation.
Our finding that information concerning the previous behaviour of group members has no
effect on cooperation seems surprising in view of numerous other studies stressing the impor-
tance of such information for cooperative decision making (e.g. 6,8,9,11). One possible reason
why information about past cooperation did not have an effect in our study may be connected
to the timing of information provision. As in the study of de Oliveira et al. [30], also we pro-
vided information about group composition at the beginning of a new interaction stage. At the
beginning of a new interaction stage, people tend to return to their original levels of coopera-
tion, even after experiencing the collapse of cooperation in previous interactions, a phenome-
non known as ‘restart effect’ [35,36]. These previous findings, together with our results,
suggest that people neglect information about the cooperativeness of others from previous
stages, or at least they are not sensitive to this information when a new stage begins.
Attempts to signal one’s cooperativeness at the start of new series of interactions may give
rise to such restart effects [37]. Evolutionary models based on the handicap principle [38] sug-
gest that such costly signaling can function as the basis for partner choice, enabling coopera-
tors to assort and form new successful cooperative interactions [37,39–41]. Less cooperative
individuals could also benefit from such signaling, as it is in their interest to be part of a coop-
erative group. Another mechanism that may have contributed similar cooperation levels in
informed and uninformed assorted groups is the so-called False Consensus Effect [42,43],
which states that people tend to deem their own behaviour common and appropriate, and
Assortment, but not knowledge of assortment, affects cooperation and individual success in human groups
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accordingly believe that others will behave in a similar way. If this were the case in our experi-
ment, then subjects in our Uninformed Assortment treatment already believed that others
were similar to themselves and information provided in our Informed Assortment treatment
would only have confirmed pre-existing beliefs.
To conclude, our experiment showed that assorting individuals into groups based on vary-
ing individual cooperation tendencies have a substantial effect on groups’ ability to achieve
cooperation. This was partially caused by assortment amplifying individual differences in
cooperation, particularly due to the collapse of cooperation in groups comprising only individ-
uals with lowest cooperation tendencies. Further, assortment had significant effects on the
earnings of individuals: cooperators outperformed non-cooperators in the presence of assort-
ment, but not when grouping was random. Surprisingly, however, individuals by all coopera-
tion tiers were insensitive to the provided information on group composition, suggesting that
humans are facultative users of potentially critical information.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Determinants of cooperation in fixed groups. Both models present estimates of a
Linear Mixed Model fit to individual contributions in stage 2, with ‘subject nested in group’ as
a random effect. Model 1 focuses on the effects of assortment by comparing the Uniformed
Assortment and the Uniformed Random treatments. ‘Uninformed Random’ and ‘tier 4’ are
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